The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ethics — Part 1, by Benedictus de Spinoza

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Benedict de Spinoza,alphabet blocks for 8 year olds under 25 dollars THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

PART I: CONCERNING GOD.

DEFINITIONS.

I. By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which theessence involves existence, or that of which the nature is onlyconceivable as existent.

II. A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can belimited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a bodyis called finite because we always conceive another greater body.So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body isnot limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and isconceived through itself: in other words, that of which aconception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV. By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives asconstituting the essence of substance.

V. By 'mode' I mean the modifications ("affectiones") ofsubstance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through,something other than itself.

VI. By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, asubstance consisting in infinite attributes, of which eachexpresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

>>>>>Explanation—I say absolutely infinite, not infinite afterits kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infiniteattributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involvesno negation.

VII. That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by thenecessity of its own nature, and of which the action isdetermined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing isnecessary, or rather constrained, which is determined bysomething external to itself to a fixed and definite method ofexistence or action.

VIII. By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it isconceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition ofthat which is eternal.

>>>>>Explanation—Existence of this kind is conceived as aneternal truth, like the essence of a thing and, therefore,cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, thoughcontinuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

AXIOMS. I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself orin something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must beconceived through itself.

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it isimpossible that an effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves theknowledge of a cause.

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, theone by means of the other; the conception of one does not involvethe conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essencedoes not involve existence.

PROPOSITIONS. I. Substance is by nature prior to itsmodifications.

>>>>>Proof—This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, havenothing in common.

>>>>>Proof—Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist initself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, theconception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the causeof the other.

>>>>>Proof—If they have nothing in common, it follows that onecannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).Q.E.D.

IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from theother, either by the difference of the attributes of thesubstances, or by the difference of their modifications.

>>>>>Proof—Everything which exists, exists either in itself orin something else (Ax. i.),— that is (by Deff. iii. and v.),nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, exceptsubstance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, givenbesides the understanding, by which several things may bedistinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, inother words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.Q.E.D.

V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substanceshaving the same nature or attribute.

>>>>>Proof—If several distinct substances be granted, they mustbe distinguished one from the other, either by the difference oftheir attributes, or by the difference of their modifications(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, itwill be granted that there cannot be more than one with anidentical attribute. If by the difference of theirmodifications—as substance is naturally prior to itsmodifications (Prop. i.)—it follows that setting themodifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that istruly, (Deff. iii and vi.), there cannot be conceived onesubstance different from another—that is (by Prop. iv.), therecannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.Q.E.D.

VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

>>>>>Proof—It is impossible that there should be in the universetwo substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which haveanything common to them both (Prop ii.), and, therefore (Prop.iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one beproduced by the other. Q.E.D.

<<<<<VI. Corollary—Hence it follows that a substance cannot beproduced by anything external to itself. For in the universenothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (asappears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the lastProp.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of thecontradictory. For, if substance be produced by an externalcause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of itscause (Ax. iv.), and (by Deff. iii.) it would itself not besubstance.

VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

>>>>>Proof—Substance cannot be produced by anything external(Cor., Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that is,its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongsto its nature.

VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

>>>>>Proof—There can only be one substance with an identicalattribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite orinfinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Deff. ii.) itwould then be limited by something else of the same kind, whichwould also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be twosubstances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop.v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

*****Note I.—As finite existence involves a partial negation,and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the givennature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substanceis necessarily infinite.

*****Note II.—No doubt it will be difficult for those who thinkabout things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know themby their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration ofProp. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between themodifications of substances and the substances themselves, andare ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hencethey may attribute to substances the beginning which they observein natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes makecomplete confusion—think that trees might talk just as well asmen—that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially solong as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they wouldhave no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, thisproposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself,and is conceived through itself—that is, something of which theconception requires not the conception of anything else; whereasmodifications exist in something external to themselves, and aconception of them is formed by means of a conception of thethings in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideasof non-existent modifications; for, although they may have noactual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet theiressence is so involved in something external to themselves thatthey may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truthsubstances can have, external to the intellect, must consist intheir existence, because they are conceived through themselves.Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear anddistinct—that is, a true—idea of a substance, but that he isnot sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as ifhe said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or noit was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or ifanyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the sameas saying that a false idea was true—in short, the height ofabsurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that theexistence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. Andwe can hence conclude by another process of reasoning—that thereis but one such substance. I think that this may profitably bedone at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with thedemonstration, we must premise:—

+++++1. The true definition of a thing neither involves norexpresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. Fromthis it follows that—

+++++2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number ofindividuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the natureof the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangleexpresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: itdoes not imply any fixed number of triangles.

+++++3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thinga cause why it should exist.

+++++4. This cause of existence must either be contained in thenature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulatedapart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual thingsexist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence ofexactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, iftwenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I willsuppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had nopredecessors), and we want to account for the existence of thesetwenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of humanexistence in general; we must also show why there are exactlytwenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assignedfor the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot becontained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition ofman does not involve any consideration of the number twenty.Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men,and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be soughtexternally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absoluterule, that everything which may consist of several individualsmust have an external cause. And, as it has been shown alreadythat existence appertains to the nature of substance, existencemust necessarily be included in its definition; and from itsdefinition alone existence must be deducible. But from itsdefinition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot inferthe existence of several substances; therefore it follows thatthere is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.

IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater thenumber of its attributes (Def. iv.).

X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must beconceived through itself.

>>>>>Proof—An attribute is that which the intellect perceives ofsubstance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

*****Note—It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, infact, conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of theother—yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitutetwo entities, or two different substances. For it is the natureof substance that each of its attributes is conceived throughitself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existedsimultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is,then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to onesubstance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that eachand every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and thatits reality or being is in proportion to the number of itsattributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinitebeing must necessarily be defined as consisting in infiniteattributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal andinfinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguishdifferent substances, let him read the following propositions,which show that there is but one substance in the universe, andthat it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would besought in vain.

XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, ofwhich each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,necessarily exists.

>>>>>Proof—If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that Goddoes not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarilyexists.

>>>>>Another proof—Of everything whatsoever a cause or reasonmust be assigned, either for its existence, or for itsnon-existence—e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause mustbe granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does notexist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it fromexisting, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause musteither be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or beexternal to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existenceof a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because itwould involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existenceof substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as itsnature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle doesnot follow from the nature of those figures, but from the orderof universal nature in extension. From the latter it mustfollow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it isimpossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. Itfollows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause orreason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents theexistence of God, or which destroys his existence, we mustcertainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such areason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from thevery nature of God, or be external to him—that is, drawn fromanother substance of another nature. For if it were of the samenature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. Butsubstance of another nature could have nothing in common with God(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause orto destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divineexistence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divinenature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawnfrom God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. Tomake such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite andsupremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature ofGod, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason beassigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, Godnecessarily exists. Q.E.D.

>>>>>Another proof—The potentiality of non-existence is anegation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existenceis a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarilyexists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are morepowerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviouslyabsurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a beingabsolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist eitherin ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (seeAx. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutelyinfinite—in other words, God (Def. vi.)—necessarily exists.Q.E.D.

*****Note—In this last proof, I have purposely shown God'sexistence 'a posteriori,' so that the proof might be more easilyfollowed, not because, from the same premises, God's existencedoes not follow 'a priori.' For, as the potentiality ofexistence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as realityincreases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase itsstrength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite,such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power ofexistence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there willbe many who will be unable to see the force of this proof,inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those thingswhich flow from external causes. Of such things, they see thatthose which quickly come to pass—that is, quickly come intoexistence—quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as moredifficult of accomplishment —that is, not so easily brought intoexistence—those things which they conceive as more complicated.

However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here showthe measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goesquickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view ofuniversal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: Ineed only remark that I am not here speaking of things, whichcome to pass through causes external to themselves, but only ofsubstances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by anyexternal cause. Things which are produced by external causes,whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoeverperfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy oftheir external cause; wherefore the existence of substance mustarise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but itsessence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul itsexistence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, onthe other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be morecertain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of abeing absolutely infinite or perfect—that is, of God. Forinasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involvesabsolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existenceis done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given.This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentivereader.

XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which itwould follow that substance can be divided.

>>>>>Proof—The parts into which substance as thus conceivedwould be divided either will retain the nature of substance, orthey will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each partwill necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop vi.) self-caused, and(by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, sothat, in that case, several substances could be formed out of onesubstance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, andthe whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. X) could both exist and beconceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to beabsurd. If we adopt the second alternative—namely, that theparts will not retain the nature of substance—then, if thewhole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose thenature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop.vii.) is absurd.

XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

>>>>>Proof—If it could be divided, the parts into which it wasdivided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinitesubstance, or they would not. If the former, we should haveseveral substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) isabsurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substanceabsolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) isalso absurd.

<<<<<Corollary—It follows that no substance, and consequently noextended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

*****Note—The indivisibility of substance may be more easilyunderstood as follows. The nature of substance can only beconceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing elsecan be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.)involves a manifest contradiction.

XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

>>>>>Proof—As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom noattribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if anysubstance besides God were granted, it would have to be explainedby some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the sameattribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,besides God no substance can be granted, or consequently beconceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have tobe conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of thisproof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can begranted or conceived. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I.—Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is(by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe,and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have alreadyindicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

<<<<<Corollary II.—It follows: 2. That extension and thoughtare either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents("affectiones") of the attributes of God.

XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, orbe conceived.

>>>>>Proof—Besides God, no substance is granted or can beconceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing whichis in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def.v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can onlythrough it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sumtotal of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothingcan be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body andmind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons havestrayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has beensaid. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywisereflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of thisthey find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by bodya definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by acertain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicatesuch a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhileby other reasons with which they try to prove their point, theyshow that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apartfrom the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefromthe divine nature can have been created, they are whollyignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know themeaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficientlyclearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created byanything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.)that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one ofthe infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explainmore fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, whichall start from the following points:—

Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, asthey think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can beinfinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. Thisthey illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one ortwo. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it beconceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then beeither finite or infinite. If the former, then infinitesubstance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. Ifthe latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as anotherinfinite, which is also absurd.

Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, itwill consist of an infinite number of such parts; it wouldequally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each partmeasured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelvetimes as great as the other.

Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn twodiverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart,but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distancebetween the two lines will be continually increased, until atlength it changes from definite to indefinable. As theseabsurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity asinfinite, the conclusion is drawn that extended substance mustnecessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to thenature of God.

The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection.God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being,cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it isdivisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extendedsubstance does not appertain to the essence of God.

Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who bythem try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of thedivine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, Ithink an attentive reader will see that I have already answeredtheir propositions; for all their arguments are founded on thehypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and sucha hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Cor. Prop. xiii.) tobe absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all theseabsurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not nowdiscussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusionthat extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from thenotion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion thatan infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts:therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinitequantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finiteparts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop.xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has inreality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity oftheirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extendedsubstance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting likea man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds todeny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn tothe circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance,which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that itis finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it canbe multiplied and divided.

So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed ofpoints, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot beinfinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assertthat extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than itwould be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surfaceof lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all whoknow clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those whodeny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substancecould be so divided that its parts were really separate, whyshould not one part admit of being destroyed, the othersremaining joined together as before? And why should all be sofitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in thecase of things, which are really distinct one from the other, onecan exist without the other, and can remain in its originalcondition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (ofwhich anon), but all parts are bound to come together to preventit, it follows from this that the parts cannot really bedistinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it issubstance cannot be divided.

If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally soprone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived byus in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagineit; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect.If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in ourimagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall findthat it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if weregard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive itas substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, asI have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, andindivisible. This will be plain enough to all who make adistinction between the intellect and the imagination,especially if it be remembered that matter is everywhere thesame, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far aswe conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts aredistinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, inso far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its partsto be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it isextended substance; from this point of view it is neitherseparated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it iswater, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it issubstance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.

I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact,founded on the same assumption as the first—namely, that matter,in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed ofparts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should beconsidered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it couldreceive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, andall things which come to pass, come to pass solely through thelaws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortlyshow) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can innowise be said that God is passive in respect to anything otherthan himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of thedivine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it isgranted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for thepresent.

XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow aninfinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all thingswhich can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition will be clear to everyone, whoremembers that from the given definition of any thing theintellect infers several properties, which really necessarilyfollow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thingdefined); and it infers more properties in proportion as thedefinition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, inproportion as the essence of the thing defined involves morereality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infiniteattributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infiniteessence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of itsnature an infinite number of things (that is, everything whichcan fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) mustnecessarily follow. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I.—Hence it follows, that God is the efficientcause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infiniteintellect.

<<<<<Corollary II.—It also follows that God is a cause inhimself, and not through an accident of his nature.

<<<<<Corollary III.—It follows, thirdly, that God is theabsolutely first cause.

XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is notconstrained by anyone.

>>>>>Proof—We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely fromthe necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of thingsabsolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived;but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can existoutside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained toact. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I—It follows: 1. That there can be no causewhich, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides theperfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

<<<<<Corollary II—It follows: 2. That God is the sole freecause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Cor. i.), and acts by the solenecessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) thesole free cause. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,as they think, bring it about, that those things which we havesaid follow from his nature—that is, which are in his power,should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. Butthis is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that itsthree interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; orthat from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of thisproposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God'snature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God'snature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, whichthey can attribute to God, than that which is the highestperfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God asactually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that hecan bring into existence everything which he actuallyunderstands, for they think that they would thus destroy God'spower. If, they contend, God had created everything which is inhis intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, andthis, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore,they prefer to asset that God is indifferent to all things, andthat he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by someabsolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I haveshown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.) that from God'ssupreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number ofthings—that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in aninfinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity;in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows frometernity and for eternity, that its three interior angles areequal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God hasbeen displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternityremain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating thequestion attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, farmore perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess thatGod understands an infinite number of creatable things, which hewill never be able to create, for, if he created all that heunderstands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust hisomnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in orderto establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced toestablishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to passeverything over which his power extends; this seems to be ahypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.

Further (to say a word concerning the intellect and the willwhich we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain tothe eternal essence of God, we must take these words in somesignificance quite different from those they usually bear. Forintellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the humanintellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common withthem but the name; there would be about as much correspondencebetween the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenlyconstellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I willprove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, itcannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality(Prop. xvi., Cor. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formalessence of things is as it is, because it exists byrepresentation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore theintellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constituteGod's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of theiressence and of their existence. This seems to have beenrecognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As,therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differfrom them in respect to its essence, and in respect to itsexistence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes,precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, butnot of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, butmust be different in existence; and hence if the existence of oneof them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarilycease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and bemade false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also.Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and ofthe existence of a given effect, must differ from such effectboth in respect to its essence, and also in respect to itsexistence. Now the intellect of God is the cause both of theessence and the existence of our intellect; therefore, theintellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute thedivine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect toessence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agreetherewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning wouldbe identical in the case of the will, as anyone can easily see.

XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of allthings. >>>>>Proof—All things which are, are in God, and must beconceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,Cor. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be nosubstance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external toGod. This is our second point. God, therefore, is theindwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.>>>>>Proof—God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertainsto its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from itsdefinition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. vii.). Further,by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance—in otherwords, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, shouldbe involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternityappertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown inProp. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of theattributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This proposition is also evident from the manner inwhich (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it isevident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. ofmy "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved theeternity of God, in another manner, which I need not hererepeat.

XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

>>>>>Proof—God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes areeternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expressesexistence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explainhis eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternalexistence—in other words, that which constitutes God's essenceconstitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God'sexistence and God's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I.—Hence it follows that God's existence, likehis essence, is an eternal truth.

<<<<<Corollary II.—Secondly, it follows that God, and all theattributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could bechanged in respect to existence, they must also be able to bechanged in respect to essence—that is, obviously, be changedfrom true to false, which is absurd.

XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of anyattribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in otherwords, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

>>>>>Proof—Conceive, if it be possible (supposing theproposition to be denied), that something in some attribute ofGod can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute,and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditionedexistence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed inthe attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposedto be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in itsnature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived asfinite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it isnot limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constitutedthe idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has notconstituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)must necessarily exist.

We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the ideaof God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturallyfollow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (forit is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, ifthe idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take anyexample, as the proof is of universal application) follows fromthe necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, thesaid thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our firstpoint.

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of thenature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For ifit can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of thenature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, forinstance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, andlet it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to beabout not to exist.

Now thought being an attribute of God must necessarily existunchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Cor. ii.); and beyond thelimits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latterat some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist)thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God,which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowedtherefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, oranything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature ofsome attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, butthrough the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed ofanything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God'sabsolute nature.

XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far asit is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and asinfinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarilyand as infinite.

>>>>>Proof—The proof of this proposition is similar to that ofthe preceding one.

XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and asinfinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute natureof some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by amodification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

>>>>>Proof—A mode exists in something else, through which itmust be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it existssolely in God, and solely through God can be conceived. Iftherefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing andinfinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived throughsome attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceivedas expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in otherwords (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it isconsidered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarilyexists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of someattribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through themeans of some modification, which follows from the absolutenature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), whichexists necessarily and as infinite.

XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involveexistence.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that ofwhich the nature (considered in itself) involves existence isself-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that God is not only the causeof things coming into existence, but also of their continuing inexistence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause ofthe being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we seethat it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, itcannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must bethe sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existenceappertain. (Prop. xiv. Cor. i.) Q.E.D.

XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence ofthings, but also of their essence.

>>>>>Proof—If this be denied, then God is not the cause of theessence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (byAx. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) isabsurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.Q.E.D.

*****Note—This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, theessence of things must be inferred from it, no less than theirexistence—in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. Thiswill be made still clearer by the following corollary.

<<<<<Corollary—Individual things are nothing but modificationsof the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of Godare expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appearsfrom Prop. xv. and Def. v.

XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particularmanner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and thatwhich has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself toact.

>>>>>Proof—That by which things are said to be conditioned toact in a particular manner is necessarily something positive(this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of itsexistence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficientcause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Oursecond point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if athing, which has not been conditioned by God, could conditionitself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, aswe have shown is absurd.

XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in aparticular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from Ax. iii.

XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finiteand has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditionedto act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by acause other than itself, which also is finite, and has aconditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turnexist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned forexistence and action by another cause, which also is finite, andhas a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has beenthus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Cor.)

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannotbe produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; forwhatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute ofGod is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore,follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the saidattribute is considered as in some way modified; for substanceand modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def.iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of theattributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes,in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infiniteand eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore itmust follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action byGod or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter aremodified by some modification which is finite, and has aconditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, thiscause or this modification (for the reason by which weestablished the first part of this proof) must in its turn beconditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has aconditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for thesame reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.Q.E.D.

*****Note—As certain things must be produced immediately by God,namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolutenature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, itfollows: 1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of thosethings immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not afterhis kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannoteither exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.xxiv. Cor.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remotecause of individual things, except for the sake ofdistinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or ratherfrom what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remotecause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to theeffect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend onGod, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things areconditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by thenecessity of the divine nature.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannotbe called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he existsnecessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of thedivine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider thedivine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any wayconditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only thecause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.xxiv., Cor.), but also in so far as they are considered asconditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it isimpossible, and not contingent, that they should conditionthemselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it isimpossible, and not contingent, that they should renderthemselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned bythe necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but alsoto exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothingthat is contingent. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Before going any further, I wish here to explain, whatwe should understand by nature viewed as active (naturanaturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I sayto explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by natureviewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,and is conceived through itself, or those attributes ofsubstance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in otherwords (Prop. xiv., Cor. i., and Prop. xvii., Cor. ii.) God, in sofar as he is considered as a free cause.

By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which followsfrom the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of theattributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes ofGod, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in functioninfinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and themodifications of God, and nothing else.

>>>>>Proof—A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); inother words (obviously) that which is contained in the intellectin representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But innature (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) there is no substance save God,nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God,and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore theintellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, mustcomprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,and nothing else. Q.E.D.

XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, aswill, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature andnot to active nature.

>>>>>Proof—By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolutethought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing fromother modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (byProp. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God whichexpresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be soconceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor beconceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passiverather than to nature active, as must also the other modes ofthinking. Q.E.D.

*****Note—I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only ofwhat is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act ofunderstanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. Forwe cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge ofthe act of understanding.

XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessarycause.

>>>>>Proof—Will is only a particular mode of thinking, likeintellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some causeother than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it mustalso be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of hisbeing substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of hispossessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternalessence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it beconceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause bywhich it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary orconstrained cause. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I—Hence it follows, first, that God does not actaccording to freedom of the will.

<<<<<Corollary II—It follows, secondly, that will and intellectstand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, andrest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must beconditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particularmanner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, bywhich it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinitenumber of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account besaid to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinitenumber of results from motion and rest would justify us in sayingthat motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no moreappertains to God than does anything else in nature, but standsin the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, whichwe have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particularmanner.

XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God inany manner or in any order different from that which has in factobtained.

>>>>>Proof—All things necessarily follow from the nature of God(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to existand act in a particular way (Prop. xxix). If things, therefore,could have been of a different nature, or have been conditionedto act in a different way, so that the order of nature wouldhave been different, God's nature would also have been able tobe different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop.xi.)that different nature also would have perforce existed, andconsequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.This (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) is absurd. Therefore, thingscould not have been brought into being by God in any othermanner, &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note I—As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun atnoonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling thingscontingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shallattach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the wordsnecessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence orin respect to its cause; for the existence of a thingnecessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, orfrom a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing issaid to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence ordefinition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; buta thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relationto the imperfection of our knowledge.

A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or doesnot involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it doesnot involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerningthe existence, because the order of causes escapes us,—such athing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary orimpossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

*****Note II—It clearly follows from what we have said, thatthings have been brought into being by God in the highestperfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from amost perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection inGod, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From itscontrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have justshown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had beenbrought into being in any other way, we should have to assign toGod a nature different from that, which we are bound toattribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfectbeing.

I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, andwill refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simplybecause they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom verydifferent from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. Theyassign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am alsoconvinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and dulyweigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will rejectsuch freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There isno need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence ofGod, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that thingscould not have been by him created other than they are, or in adifferent order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on whatour opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solelyon the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. Ifit were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from alleternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would beconvicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is nosuch thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solelyfrom the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or neverwould have decreed anything but what is; that God did not existbefore his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, itis said, supposing that God had made a different universe, orhad ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning natureand her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfectionin God. But persons who say this must admit that God can changehis decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerningnature and her order, different from those which he hasordained—in other words, if he had willed and conceivedsomething different concerning nature—he would perforce havehad a different intellect from that which he has, and also adifferent will. But if it were allowable to assign to God adifferent intellect and a different will, without any change inhis essence or his perfection, what would there be to preventhim changing the decrees which he has made concerning createdthings, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellectand will concerning things created and their order are the same,in respect to his essence and perfection, however they beconceived.

Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God'sintellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as theyalso admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God'sessence are identical, it follows that, if God had had adifferent actual intellect and a different will, his essencewould also have been different; and thus, as I concluded atfirst, if things had been brought into being by God in adifferent way from that which has obtained, God's intellect andwill, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce havebeen different, which is absurd.

As these things could not have been brought into being by God inany but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as thetruth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection ofGod; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves tobelieve that God did not wish to create all the things which werein his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection ashe had understood them.

But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection norimperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to becalled perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on thewill of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought itabout that what is now perfection should be extremeimperfection, and vice versa. What is such an assertion, butan open declaration that God, who necessarily understands thatwhich he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that heshould understand things differently from the way in which hedoes understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the heightof absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against itsemployers, as follows:—All things depend on the power of God.In order that things should be different from what they are,God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God'swill cannot be different (as we have just most clearlydemonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither canthings be different. I confess, that the theory which subjectsall things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts thatthey are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truththan the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in allthings with a view of promoting what is good. For these latterpersons seem to set up something beyond God, which does notdepend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only anothername for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utterabsurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the firstand only free cause of the essence of all things and also oftheir existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refutingsuch wild theories.

XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence.

>>>>>Proof—From the sole necessity of the essence of God itfollows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of allthings (Prop. xvi. and Cor.). Wherefore the power of God, bywhich he and all things are and act, is identical with hisessence. Q.E.D.

XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,necessarily exists.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the lastProp.) be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that itnecessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.Q.E.D.

XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does notfollow.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essencein a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Cor.); that is,(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a givenconditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of allthings, therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarilyfollow. Q.E.D.

APPENDIX: In the foregoing I have explained the nature andproperties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists,that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity ofhis own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and howhe is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, thatwithout him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly,that all things are predetermined by God, not through his freewill or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God orinfinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, takencare to remove the prejudices, which might impede thecomprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remainmisconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very gravehindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things,as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worthwhile to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.

All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained,that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely,with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that Godhimself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is saidthat God made all things for man, and man that he might worshiphim). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally soprone to adopt it?; secondly, I will point out its falsity;and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudicesabout good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order andconfusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this isnot the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature ofthe human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as astarting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that allhave the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and thatthey are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first,that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious oftheir volitions and desires, and never even dream, in theirignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish anddesire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, forthat which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus itcomes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the finalcauses of events, and when these are learned, they are content,as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn suchcauses from external sources, they are compelled to turn toconsidering themselves, and reflecting what end would haveinduced them personally to bring about the given event, and thusthey necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, asthey find in themselves and outside themselves many means whichassist them not a little in the search for what is useful, forinstance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animalsfor yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea forbreeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as ameans for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware,that they found these conveniences and did not make them, theythink they have cause for believing, that some other being hasmade them for their use. As they look upon things as means, theycannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from themeans which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, theyare bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universeendowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adaptedeverything for human use. They are bound to estimate the natureof such rulers (having no information on the subject) inaccordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert thatthe gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order tobind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself,according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God,so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct thewhole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidityand insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed intosuperstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for thisreason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explainthe final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show thatnature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless toman, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result:among the many helps of nature they were bound to find somehindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so theydeclared that such things happen, because the gods are angry atsome wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed intheir worship. Experience day by day protested and showed byinfinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lotof pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon theirinveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class suchcontradictions among other unknown things of whose use they wereignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate conditionof ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoningand start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, thatGod's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such adoctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from thehuman race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnishedanother standard of verity in considering solely the essence andproperties of figures without regard to their final causes.There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besidesmathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directedto these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledgeof the truth.

I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is noneed to show at length, that nature has no particular goal inview, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, Ithink, is already evident enough, both from the causes andfoundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based,and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii.,and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, thateverything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and withthe utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks inorder to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. Thatwhich is really a cause it considers as an effect, and viceversa: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, andthat which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.Passing over the questions of cause and priority asself-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. thatthe effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God;the effect which requires for its production severalintermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But ifthose things which were made immediately by God were made toenable him to attain his end, then the things which come after,for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily themost excellent of all.

Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires somethingwhich he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians drawa distinction between the object of want and the object ofassimilation; still they confess that God made all things forthe sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They areunable to point to anything prior to creation, except Godhimself, as an object for which God should act, and aretherefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that Godlacked those things for whose attainment he created means, andfurther that he desired them.

We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine,anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, haveimported a new method of argument in proof of theirtheory—namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but toignorance; thus showing that they have no other method ofexhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from aroof onto someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrateby their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill theman; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object,how could so many circumstances (and there are often manyconcurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance?Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts thatthe wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. "Butwhy," they will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was theman at that very time walking that way?" If you again answer,that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to beagitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, andthat the man had been invited by a friend, they will againinsist: "But why was the sea agitated, and why was the maninvited at that time?" So they will pursue their questions fromcause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will ofGod—in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again,when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed;and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art,conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but bydivine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together thatone part shall not hurt another.

Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, andstrives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denouncedas an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as theinterpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that,with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their onlyavailable means for proving and preserving their authority wouldvanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to mythird point.

After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is createdis created for their sake, they were bound to consider as thechief quality in everything that which is most useful tothemselves, and to account those things the best of all whichhave the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they werebound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the natureof things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief thatthey are free agents arose the further notions of praise andblame, sin and merit.

I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of humannature; the former I will briefly explain here.

Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God theyhave called good, everything which hinders these objects theyhave styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand thenature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merelyimagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination forunderstanding, such persons firmly believe that there is anorder in things, being really ignorant both of things and theirown nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that theimpression they make on our senses requires little effort ofimagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we saythat they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they areill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easilyimagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order toconfusion—as though there were any order in nature, except inrelation to our imagination—and say that God has created allthings in order; thus, without knowing it, attributingimagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that Godforesaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that itshould be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, theywould not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find aninfinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination,and very many others which confound its weakness. But enoughhas been said on this subject. The other abstract notions arenothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination isdifferently affected: though they are considered by theignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as theybelieve that everything was created for the sake of themselves;and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,healthy or rotten or corrupt. For instance, if the motion whichobjects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motionbe excited, they are styled ugly.

Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styledfragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,full-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,rough or smooth, &c.

Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound,or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough tobelieve, that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; andphilosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, thatthe motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony—all ofwhich instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of thingsaccording to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes forthings the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonderthat there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed,and finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in manyrespects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that whatseems good to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing toone displeases another, and so on. I need not furtherenumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject atlength, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known.It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds; everyone iswise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates."All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things accordingto their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand:for, if they understood phenomena, they would, asmathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what Ihave urged.

We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly givenof nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate thetrue nature of anything, but only the constitution of theimagination; and, although they have names, as though they wereentities, existing externally to the imagination, I call thementities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, allarguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easilyrebutted.

Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity ofthe absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so manyimperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corruptto the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil,sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easilyconfuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned onlyfrom their own nature and power; things are not more or lessperfect, according as they are serviceable or repugnant tomankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men,that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answerbut this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creationof every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, morestrictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as tosuffice for the production of everything conceivable by aninfinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.

Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if thereare any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipatethem for himself with the aid of a little reflection.

END OF PART I

End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part I], by Benedict de Spinoza

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